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Abstract
Highly pathogenic influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 proved to be remarkably mobile in migratory bird populations where it has
led to extensive outbreaks for which the true number of affected birds usually cannot be determined. For the evaluation of
avian influenza monitoring and HPAIV early warning systems, we propose a time-series analysis that includes the estimation
of confidence intervals for (i) the prevalence in outbreak situations or (ii) in the apparent absence of disease in time intervals
for specified regional units. For the German outbreak regions in 2006 and 2007, the upper 95% confidence limit allowed the
detection of prevalences below 1% only for certain time intervals. Although more than 25,000 birds were sampled in
Germany per year, the upper 95% confidence limit did not fall below 5% in the outbreak regions for most of the time. The
proposed analysis can be used to monitor water bodies and high risk areas, also as part of an early-warning system. Chances
for an improved targeting of the monitoring system as part of a risk-based approach are discussed with the perspective of
reducing sample sizes.
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Introduction
Since 1997, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV)
subtype H5N1 of Asian origin has caused outbreaks among
poultry and wild birds in a number of countries in Asia, Europe,
and Africa. In Southeast Asia and Egypt the virus became endemic
in poultry [1,2] adversely affecting poultry production in small
husbandries and intensive livestock holdings in these regions. In
2005 HPAIV H5N1 also emerged in Europe. In general, cases in
wild birds preceded those in poultry holdings in a number of
European countries. It has therefore been proposed that infected
wild birds introduced the virus in late 2005 or early 2006 [3]. This
also sparked fears of a continuous threat through forward-
backward transmission of the virus between wild birds and
domestic poultry. In addition, there is evidence for an increased
risk of the establishment of independent transmission cycles among
poultry through subclinically infected domestic ducks [4]. Only
recently has a detailed knowledge about the course of infection in
certain wild water bird species been obtained [5,6].
The contribution of poultry and wild birds to the distribution of
HPAIV H5N1 is still controversial. Poultry movement and wild
bird migration are difficult to assess in a quantitative manner [3].
Many investigators rely on the assumption that the spread of this
highly mobile virus is reflected by the spatial distribution of cases.
But there are limited analyses on the possibilities and constraints
that underlie the monitoring approaches, which may lead to a
biased and a distorted image of the disease spread. Insufficient
sample sizes and selection bias cause problems in assessing risk
factors and in performing parameter estimates regarding the
spread of HPAIV H5N1 via poultry and wild birds [7,8].
The infection dynamics of HPAIV H5N1 in wild birds in
Germany in 2006 and 2007 exhibited a specific pattern [9,10]. All
outbreaks were initially connected with water bodies, either seashore
or freshwater lakes of various sizes. The epidemic in 2006 among
several species of the orders of Anseriformes and Charadriiformes
with the epicentre at the coast of the Baltic Sea was the most
extended outbreak of HPAIV H5N1 in space and time for wild birds
in Europe [9]. Three days after the detection of the first case at the
Wittow Ferry on the Isle of Ruegen, a wild duck was confirmed
positive for HPAIV H5N1 in the Wismar Bay, 137 km away from
the first case on the Isle of Ruegen (Figure 1). Within a few days,
infected birds were sampled in various places along the coastline,
indicating that the virus was present in the entire region more or less
at the same time. After some weeks, the incidence among wild birds
decreased at the coastline. A time-space pattern similar to the one
observed at the coastline of the Baltic Sea was found at Lake
Constance in 2006 [11] and at the Helme reservoir, Berga-Kelbra,
where HPAIV H5N1 suddenly emerged in summer 2007 and
caused large numbers of lethal infections in wild birds, mainly in
Black-necked Grebes (Podiceps nigricollis).
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scale contact transmissions which are facilitated in spatially
continuous water bodies. In contrast, wetlands, which are
geographically separated, have to be bridged by bird movements
[9]. This correlates with observations in Germany indicating that
after the initial epidemics the overland spread of the virus bridging
agricultural and forest areas was much slower.
There is increasing evidence indicating that influenza viruses
can remain infectious in surface water for extended periods,
especially at low temperature (between 4uC and 10uC) and low
salinity [12,13]. Influenza viruses may also accumulate in
sediments of the littoral zone of shallow lakes [14]. This property
may turn shorelines of lakes into infectious patches along flyways.
For risk assessments regarding the spread of HPAIV H5N1 into
new localities or poultry holdings after the introduction into wild
bird population, a profound evaluation procedure of the wild bird
monitoring at distinct geographical sites is necessary.
The principal aim of this study was to analyze the efficacy of the
German avian influenza monitoring program in wild birds by a
statistical evaluation model integrating the different aspects of wild
bird monitoring data and incorporating external knowledge about
bird species. We show that the presence of HPAIV H5N1 cannot
be excluded for several temporal and spatial units despite intensive
monitoring activities. The methodological approach is likely
extendable and easily adaptable to other regions and pathogens.
Methods
As a member state of the European Union, Germany is legally
obligated to implement a surveillance program on avian influenza
in wild birds (Article 4, Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20
December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian
influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC, following ‘Guide-
lines on the implementation of surveillance programs for avian
influenza in wild birds to be carried out in the Member States’,
Annex II, Commission Decision of 13 April 2007 on the
implementation of surveillance programs for avian influenza in
poultry and wild birds to be carried out in the Member States and
amending Decision 2004/450/EC). All animal work was con-
ducted according to these legal requirements and guidelines and
all animals were handled in strict accordance with good animal
practice as defined by the relevant national and/or local animal
welfare bodies.
Apparently healthy birds were selected for testing by ornitholo-
gists, hunters or veterinarians following the national plan for avian
influenza monitoring which allocates different minimum sample
sizes to the German federal states and districts according to their
area (active monitoring). Furthermore, deceased or sick birds were
collected and tested for avian influenza (passive monitoring).
Sampling is therefore not random and the sampled subpopulation
is likely to be biased. Oropharyngeal and/or cloacal swabs were
taken from live birds or carcasses and sent to each of the regional
laboratories.Initialtestingwasperformed byanInfluenza-Ageneric
rRT-PCR (M-PCR). M-PCR-positive samples were further ana-
lysed for H5-, H7- and N1-specific genome segments. In H5-
positive samples, the HA cleavage-site that influences the pathoge-
nicity of the isolate was determined by sequencing or by a specific
rRT-PCR [15]. For the purpose of this study, only HPAIV H5N1-
positive birds were considered as cases. The specificity of the
monitoring system is assumed to be nearly 100% since positive test
results arere-assessed byadditional confirmatoryand differentiating
tests. The sensitivity of the system is determined by the sampling
approach and the diagnostic sensitivity of the initial M-PCR.
For data collection, a national wild bird monitoring database
was established. Central information storage was performed in a
SQL database. An internet-server was installed for data-entry and
descriptive inspection including maps and diagrams. A hierarchi-
cal bird identifier which is based on species level and comprises
430 different species allowed the precise identification of the birds
in the database. If the species of a bird was not known, information
at the family or genus level could be entered (40 families, 9
genera). For each bird that tested negative for avian influenza, the
sampling site was recorded at the municipality level. For birds that
tested positive for HPAIV H5N1 (‘cases’), the geographic
coordinates of the sampling site were recorded. If the sampling
date was missing, it was replaced by the data the sample arrived at
the laboratory.
A statistical evaluation model was developed which is based on
the determination of measurement sites as geographical features of
interest for which an analysis of the monitoring is proposed. At
these sites the prevalence (p) of HPAIV H5N1 cases in the sampled
population of wild birds was smoothed in time and space. For each







where xk is the diagnostic result of sample k, d(xk) is the date
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For this prevalence, the 95% upper confidence limit (UCL) was
calculated, and for both, the estimated prevalence and the UCL,
an analysis was performed for each measurement site. For time-
dependent effects of different specimens, a smoothing window of
14 days pre- and post-sampling on the basis of a weighted moving
average was implemented. The weighting considers specific
coefficients for the spatial distance of the sample collection to
the measurement site (wek) and the species selection (wsk). All
calculations were done in R [16] (Text S1).
For each bird, the lowest accepted spatial resolution of the
sampling site was the municipality level which is on average
28.82 km
2. The centroids of the municipalities were used to
calculate ranges. For cases, the geographic coordinates of the
sampling sites were used for distance determinations. Evaluation
zones are defined for each measurement site as buffers which are
limited by the time interval and the geographical range the
monitoring database contained complete data records for. The
distance (B) to the boundary of this buffer was used as an endpoint
Figure 1. Spatio-temporal pattern of HPAIV H5N1 cases at the
Baltic Sea.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.g001
Monitoring H5N1 in Wild Birds
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6639in the analysis. The distance between measurement and sampling
site was determined using ArcGIS
TM (ESRI
, Redlands, CA.,
USA). The analysis incorporated a linear weighting factor (wek)
determined by the distance (Dk) of the sampling to the
measurement site. In this study the shorelines of the Baltic Sea,
a freshwater lake near the town of Wusterhausen and the
coordinates of an outbreak in a domestic duck holding were
evaluated. Municipalities which are adjacent to the measurement
site or whose centroid is within 2000 meters were assigned the
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Confidence limits for prevalence estimations depend on the
likelihood of virus detection in the tested individual. The probability
of virus detection may depend on the susceptibility of different wild
bird species and the health status of a bird at sampling. Therefore
two species indices were introduced as weighting factors for the
point and the interval estimator (Figure 2). Using a list of 82
susceptible species reported in 2007 [17], a transmission index (TM-
index) was determined to evaluate the objectives of the active
monitoringusingthecriterialisted inTable1asaroughestimatefor
the ability of a species to transmit and distribute HPAIV H5N1. A
second index estimated morbidity and mortality (MM-index) due to
HPAIV H5N1 infection in those species sampled by passive
monitoring. The MM-index is considered a measure for the ability
of a species to develop clinical signs in reaction to infection with
HPAIV H5N1. The data sources for susceptible birds were the wild
bird species known to be affected by HPAIV H5N1 in Germany
and the species reported in the chart of affected species in the
United States Geological Survey [18]. The indices were trans-
formed for each sampling event in a weighting factor (wsk)u s e dt o
classify their value for monitoring as optimal, medium or minimal.
In the time series analysis different confidence limits were visualized
to compare different scenarios. The individual weightings of the
sampling event were compared to a minimal scenario, i.e.
untargeted bird selection, and with an optimised scenario, where
each sampling had an optimal value for monitoring.
Spatial autocorrelation was calculated in the R-package spdep
using a contiguity neighbourhood weight for the municipalities in
the study area.
Sample sizes were calculated from the statistical evaluation
model using the formula of Cannon and Roe [19] for an arbitrary
simulated measurement site:








where n is the necessary sample size, a the error probability, d the
number of positive animals and N the population size. The main
assumptions for the statistical evaluation model are (i) a 100 km
circular buffer including an average number of equally sized
municipalities, (ii) a uniform distribution of sampling in space and
time and (iii) an optimal species selection.
Results
Bird species coverage of the monitoring system
The dataset of the German wild bird monitoring comprised
16,554 entries for areas of complete coverage in 2006 and 25,545
entries for 2007. During this time, 217 different bird species were
tested (Table 2). The proportion of birds with classification at the
species level increased from 61.3% in 2006 to 81.7% in 2007.
Active monitoring accounted for 52.9% on average. During the
initial stage, the proportion of active monitoring increased from
28.4% in 2006 to 68.7% in 2007. Passive monitoring of deceased
Figure 2. Weighting scheme for wild bird species.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.g002
Table 1. Criteria for the composition of two indices for wild bird species.
Indices Definition
TM=1‘‘low’’ (i) listed in Veen et al (all Procellariiformes; Strigiformes; Prunellidae; Turdidae (except the Trushes) and (ii) not considered as high risk species
TM=2‘‘medium’’ (i) not listed by Veen et al. and (ii) no other information available
TM=3‘‘high’’ 82 high risk species
MM=1‘‘low’’ No reference or information of cases of HPAIV H5N1 in this species
MM=2‘‘medium’’ Species from the same family (resp. genera within Anatidae and Accipitridae) reported as cases infected with HPAIV H5N1
MM=3‘‘high’’ (i) Species for which fatal H5N1 cases were reported from Germany or (ii) U.S.Geological Survey (=52 species)
MM=Index for Mortality and Morbidity; TM=Transmission-index.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.t001
Monitoring H5N1 in Wild Birds
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6639and sick wild birds accounted for 99.8% of all samples that tested
positive for HPAIV H5N1 (Table 3). By active monitoring, only a
single HPAIV H5N1 infected bird was detected [9]: a Mute Swan
which was sampled 24 km from the Helme reservoir at Berga-
Kelbra five days after the start of an outbreak in July 2007 that
affected mostly Black-necked Grebes.
Development of the monitoring in time and space
Constant temporal and spatial sampling rates are required for
mobile pathogens like HPAIV H5N1 to achieve a considerable
degree of confidence in the results. Analysis of the temporal
distribution of the sampling within the wild bird monitoring
program showed, however, that the sampling rates decreased after
an initial period of intensive testing upon detection of the index
case and reached a more or less constant level (Figure 3). Short-
term infrequent sampling produced unbalanced datasets with high
autocorrelation in time, ranging between 0 samples on some days
and up to 300 on others. The variation in space exhibited a similar
pattern (Figure 4). The allocation of the monitoring activities to
the different German federal states led to a nearly homogeneous
distribution of the sample size over the entire country at the state
level Measure of overall spatial autocorrelation: (Moran’s I: 0.09;
C-l: 0.08-0.1; expected value: 20.00008) [20]. Yet, irregular
sampling at the district or municipality level produced data with
considerable spatial dependencies. Sampling often concentrated
around outbreak areas and on susceptible species. This prompted
for instance high sample sizes at the Baltic Sea coast and at Lake
Constance in reaction to outbreaks in these locations.
Evaluation of monitoring activities by time series analysis
To assess the reliability of disease parameters, we estimated the
prevalence of HPAIV H5N1 in wild birds at distinct measurement
sites and calculated interval estimates of the virus prevalence which
may have remained undetected. Immediately after the initial
detection of HPAIV H5N1 at the German coast of the Baltic Sea
and during the following spread, massive sampling of wild birds
followed in this area (Figure 5, C). This led to high confidence in the
prevalence estimates, but due to the bias caused by the sampling of
certain bird species during the outbreak, more extensive virus
circulation cannot be excluded (Figure 5, A). The last positive wild
bird in this area was detected on April 4, 2006. Thereafter, a period
of low sampling rates followed during spring and summer 2006.
Only prevalences abovea level of 3%to 8%canbe excludedfor this
time span. Sampling increased again between September 2006 and
May 2007 with the effect that the monitoring system was able to
detect low prevalences between 15 October 2006 and 15 March
2007 with an UCL varying between 0.4% and 2.0% (Figure 5, B).
Since no HPAIV H5N1 was detected during this period, it can be
impliedthat the prevalencewasbelowthe respective thresholdvalue
in the area. Based on these estimates and their confidence intervals,
it can be largely excluded that an outbreak occurred but remained
undetected in this time span in the Baltic Sea region. After this
period, the monitoring activity decreased again and was insufficient
to exclude a prevalence of,5% in the Baltic Sea region between 01
July 2007 and 01 November2007.At thesametime, HPAIV H5N1
circulated in central and southern Germany as evident by a local
epidemic among Black-necked Grebes at the Helme reservoir, as
wellascasesintwodomesticduckholdingsand inMute Swans.Asa
second example, outbreaks of HPAIV H5N1 infections in a
domestic duck holding detected on 25 August 2007 were studied
[4]. Two months before the outbreak, infections with genetically
closely related viruses were detected at a distance of 42 km mainly
in Mute Swans in Nuremberg on 23 June 2007. Taking the farm as
the focal point, the monitoring action in wild birds in a radius of
118 km was low before the first infection was detected in
Nuremberg (Figure 5, D). Sampling increased after the case had
been confirmed and led to a higher precision of the prevalence
estimates. The UCL in the time interval between 23 June and 25
August 2007 varied between 7% and 13%, i.e. virus circulation in
the wild bird population at relatively high levels could not be ruled
out. In most parts of Germany, HPAIV H5N1 was not detected in
2006 and 2007. In these regions, the sampling procedures of the
monitoring system could not be geographically linked to outbreaks.
A freshwater lake near Wusterhausen, Brandenburg, was consid-
ered as an example for this situation (Figure 5, E). No outbreak was
detected in this area and a high prevalence among wild birds can be
excluded. For most time periods, a prevalence of,5% could not be
ruled out, for some intervals the detection limit was as high as 10%.
Species scoring
The species indices were retrospectively evaluated. During the
monitoring in 2006, 45.1% of the samples could be regarded as
Table 2. Monitoring of different wild bird species and their status during sampling.
Year Sample entries Number of species Species deter-mined Type of monitoring
active passive Unknown
alive hunted % dead sick %
2006 *16,554 165 61.3% 3,825 884 28.4 11,658 33 70.6 154
2007 25,545 190 81.7% 16,023 1,523 68.7 7,898 101 31.3 0
total 42,099 217 73.7% 19,848 2,407 52.9 19,556 134 46.7 154
*For data integrity reasons all analyses are restricted to the areas of complete coverage.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.t002
Table 3. Documented HPAIV H5N1 cases and bird species
determination.
Year Type of monitoring Bird species determined
active passive
2006 0 224 (343*) 159 (160*) 71% (46.6%*)
2007 1** 326 320 98.2%
total 1** 550 (669*) 479 (480*) 87.1% (71.6%*)
*data for whole Germany in 2006.
**Mute Swan which was sampled in 24 kilometre distance five days after the
outbreak at the Helme reservoir at Berga-Kelbra, 2007.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.t003
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species selection (Table 1). The proportion increased to 68% in
2007. For the different measurement sites, the study area in
Middle Franconia produced 78.8%, the Baltic Sea coast 60.2%
and the zone around Wusterhausen 61.5% optimal index values.
These index values were introduced into the statistical evaluation
model as a weighting factor (Figure 5). The individual species
indices were compared with an optimal and a minimum scenario
for bird selection in the time-series analysis. For most intervals at
the Baltic Sea coast, the individual scenarios could not be
distinguished from the optimal scenario. A significant loss in
detection power could not be observed. In other regions,
considerable differences from the optimal scenario were evident,
e.g. at Lake Wusterhausen during 2007. Therefore, improved bird
species selection might have increased the confidence in the
prevalence estimate in regions other than the Baltic Sea coast area.
Discussion
Wild birds that carry and excrete HPAIV form a contact
network and enable the virus to become a geographically highly
mobile pathogen [21]. Due to their remoteness, varying
populations and the migratory behavior of many wild bird species,
these animals constitute a major challenge for designing disease
monitoring and monitoring systems. A sound scientific analysis of
data at the national and international level is required for risk
assessments and scientific advice to risk managers [22,23]. The
Figure 3. Results of the HPAIV H5N1 monitoring. Regions with cases of HPAIV H5N1 infection in wild birds in Germany (A). Spatial distribution
of the wild bird monitoring in German municipalities 2007 (samples per square kilometer) (B). After the initial outbreak on the Isle of Ruegen (1), only
three cases were recorded in inland municipalities at the coastline of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (2). Most of the cases in the neighboring
states of Brandenburg (3) and Schleswig–Holstein (4) were reported several weeks afterwards in March and April 2006. HPAIV H5N1 cases at Lake
Constance (5) were connected to further spread in smaller wetland areas in Bavaria (6). The massive outbreak in 2007 at the Helme reservoir at Berga-
Kelbra (7) was related to four cases eastward in Saxony (8).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.g003
Figure 4. Distribution of wild bird samples. The daily number of
wild bird samples tested for avian influenza is shown for the period 01
January 2006 until 01 March 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.g004
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different species weighting (A) after the outbreak at the Baltic Sea coast. Detailed extract of the most intensive monitoring phase (B). Daily frequency
of tests for the same time span in that region (C). Monitoring in a 118 km buffer around an outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in a domestic duck farm (D).
Exemplary analysis in a region inside a 118 km buffer at a lake without cases of HPAIV H5N1 (Lake Wusterhausen) (E). The statistical evaluation model
was weighted using individual weighting indices (blue) or by selection of samples with an optimal value of the weighting factor (green) and a
minimal scenario where birds were completely untargeted selected for sampling (orange). The spatial buffer applied to the sea-shore is 34 km.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.g005
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the virus and a high prevalence can be excluded at some time
points, for some species and some areas, where no case of HPAI
H5N1 was found. In contrast, prevalences regularly reported for
LPAIV for some wild bird species in other countries cannot be
excluded with this system. Due to low sample sizes and partially
untargeted sampling, the probability of detection of infected
animals was low for most intervals and bird species.
Incontrast tothe passive monitoring,whichonlyhastheabilityto
detect virus in species that are infected sub-clinically, the sampling
of apparently healthy birds (active monitoring) was unable to either
detect or exclude transmission (Table 3). The only case detected by
active monitoring suggested a radial virus distribution from the
epicentre of an epidemic among Black-necked Grebes. Alternative-
ly, the bird may have contracted the infection in the focus of the
epidemic, moved and was sampled during the incubation period.
Generally speaking, the active monitoring failed to prove or reject
any hypotheses regarding specific species-related virus dissemina-
tion of HPAIV H5N1 in Germany.
The increase in precision in species selection is probably the
result of improving knowledge of the sample collectors and an
improved cooperation between diagnosticians and ornithologists.
The indexing of species and the statistical evaluation model
showed that the selection of specific target will improve the
effectiveness of the monitoring program.
There are two main objectives for the determination of
confidence limits for animal disease monitoring results. The first
is related to quality assurance and describes whether a system can
be used to verify or reject a hypothesis. The second objective is
more related to empirical science and describes the proportion of
the disease impact that remains undetected and may contribute to
unnoticed spread of an infection. The evaluation procedure
described in this paper for the monitoring of HPAIV H5N1 may
prove useful for the detection of time intervals, geographical units
and population subgroups where monitoring is insufficient to
detect or exclude the presence of a pathogen at a low prevalence.
Questions regarding the effect of single sampling events on
precision and confidence limits remain open.
Since spatial dependencies can lead to a decrease in detection
power of monitoring systems, especially in the short-term detection
of an infectious pathogen introduced in large regions [24], precise
population parameters are required for each region to obtain
reliable estimates of the power of the monitoring system. As data
on population sizes are lacking in wild animals, confidence limits
specific for selected geographical measurement sites may provide
an alternative for estimating the detection power for specific time
intervals.
When the statistical evaluation model described here is applied
to Germany as a whole, it can be calculated that 318 samples need
to be tested daily to detect a prevalence of HPAIV H5N1 in wild
birds exceeding 1% (Table 4). This corresponds to 116,070
samples per year which is more than 4-fold the sample size
obtained in 2007. However, transmission of some LPAIV subtypes
proved to occur far below this threshold [25,26]. The same may
also be true for HPAIV H5N1. Thus, installing a reliable
monitoring system over a long period with limited resources still
remains a major challenge.
The performance of a monitoring system is also reflected by the
degree of confidence which is obtained by the data. This depends
to a high degree on the assumptions on the pathogen to be
monitored. HPAIV H5N1 proved to be highly-mobile and
requires an improved targeted approach.
Figure 6. Distribution of indices at the time of sampling.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006639.g006
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defined bird species at selected spots with reasonable sample sizes
could lead to more reliable monitoring results with improved
confidence. Furthermore ornithological as well as veterinary
knowledge and infrastructure has to be integrated to develop a
risk-based approach and to target particular bird species. A
sensitive classification of species into risk categories and sampling
individuals of these species at different time points along their
flyways may aid in this respect. Moreover, time and location in
relation to the migration routes of birds have to be taken into
account. Participatory approaches involving local ornithologists
can lead to an early detection of wild bird populations with
increased density and unusual mortality and morbidity. Alterna-
tive monitoring approaches using sentinel birds, i.e. virus-negative
birds that are closely monitored on a virological basis in areas of
increased risk, can be related to local wild bird censuses and
provide disease information for long time ranges [27]. Another
possibility would be to focus on predator birds and scavengers
which feed on a variety of diseased or dead birds leading to an
increased probability to become exposed to HPAIV H5N1. As
they proved to be susceptible to the virus, they could be a future
target for improved monitoring in wild birds in Germany.
The evaluation model described in this study may help to
analyze incoming monitoring data on avian influenza and to
improve the targeting of monitoring programs. It should also be
possible to apply it to other wildlife diseases.
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